

Executive Registry
73-3862

6 July 1973

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT: USIB Committee Reorganization

1. We have briefed the concept of the new USIB committee structure to the following:

- a. Director, DIA and key staff members.
- b. Director, NSA and key staff members.
- c. Director, INR.
- d. Andy Marshall.
- e. Key CIA Deputy Directors.

2. We got a generally favorable reaction from the USIB members and their staffs to the proposition of establishment of the geographic committees as prime elements of the USIB structure. None of these individuals, however, was requested to approve the concept in detail. They were well aware that we were merely familiarizing them with a concept and that they would have opportunity for formal comment later. They were also informed that our briefings did not constitute an indication of DCI approval.

3. Admiral de Poix's reaction was generally favorable although he was concerned about the disappearance of the SIGINT Committee as a prime committee of USIB. As of this date he appears unpersuaded by our counter-argument that he would, in fact, have a more direct and continuous voice in establishing requirements, objectives and priorities for SIGINT through his membership at the top of the geographic committees.

4. Ray Cline expressed no problem with the concept but recommended that in addition to our proposed structure, a "USIB steering committee," consisting of a senior representative of CIA, DIA and INR, be established to oversee the work of the geographic committees. This looked like a good possibility to us at first glance since our proposal thus far did not address the problem of conflicting objectives, priorities, etc. between the geographic committees. In a later conversation with Admiral de Poix, however, the latter commented that such a steering committee would tend to usurp the prerogatives of the USIB itself. This is a sound argument. There are two other options for resolving inter-committee disagreements prior to USIB consideration of issues:

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a. Establish ad hoc committees of the key elements of the geographic committees to resolve disputes; or ✓

b. Expand the role of the USIB Secretariat to cover such matters.

5. General Phillips of NSA expressed concern only that our charts did not show NSA as a regular member of the geographic committees. Since he is a member of USIB, it is very difficult to argue that he not be represented in such committees and, in fact, membership will probably have to be offered on each geographic committee to each USIB agency desiring representation (this would exclude the Services, however). ✓
Other than that, General Phillips seemed to have no problems; not surprising, he voiced no objection to the disappearance of the SIGINT Committee. ?

6. Mr. Marshall's initial reaction to the USIB reorganization was mild approval. However, since that time, he has become more of an enthusiastic supporter of the idea.

7. The only sharp opposition to the proposal came from the DDI and DD/S&T, the primary point of contention revolving around the question of the USIB committee chairmen being special representatives to the DCI. Carl Duckett was especially strong in his objections to this concept, maintaining that the idea of a chairman who would not control an operating element in the Community meant that such chairman would lose contact with reality and thus be unable to respond well. He pointed out the value of such committees as GMAIC where missile experts could get together and thoroughly thrash out a problem concerning areas of expertise. Ed Proctor contended that the geographic committees simply reorganized things without making any real difference. He considered the reorganization "a facade."]

8. There could be several aspects to their concern. One is the valid need for direct contact between CIA Deputy Directors and the NSC staff on certain highly sensitive matters; this link must always be available to the DCI when needed and could be available in any committee structure. Another aspect is that the area chairmen, or the area specialists on the DCI's personal staff, may become the contact points with some authorities and, in contrast to DDI or DD/S&T, will not have an analytical organization supporting them. On the other hand, an advantage is that the coordination function accomplished by the area men should relieve the line deputies of time-consuming activities without degrading their authority. ✓

9. With regard to the "facade" argument, I believe that the current USIB committee structure fits that description and our proposed structure does not. As most knowledgeable observers of USIB activity would admit, the USIB structure now forms an "umbrella" under which the appearances of Community effort can be given vigorous unilateral efforts by various agencies and offices. The new concept, by permitting evaluation of all Community efforts against substantive intelligence problems, really puts teeth in the USIB management. It puts the Community in the position of having to respond collectively to the needs of NSC and actually provide advice to the DCI on management problems. The members will still be able to defend their institutional interests--their prime function now--but in addition they will have to come more closely to grips with the problem of responding to substantive needs of the NSC.

10. We have adjusted our concept of the USIB committee structure to take account of comments from those we have briefed to include those comments received from you concerning weapons technology and economic intelligence. The basic structure is as indicated on the attached chart. As you can see, we have maintained seven geographic committees and a Security Committee as the prime committees of USIB. However, we have also retained supporting groups covering the key collection resource disciplines, scientific and technical intelligence, and economic intelligence. Per your suggestion, we now recommend that the IHC be incorporated in the IC Staff.

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11. One other aspect of the committee structure which we have not stressed in our briefings is the feasibility of charging those committees with the production and coordination of NIEs and NIAMs. This could be done by adding a few substantive experts to the immediate staff of the committee chairmen. We would visualize the NIE/NIAM (and NSSM) process about as follows:

- Request for NIE, NIAM or NSSM and scope from NSC, NSCIC or other national consumer.
- Assignment and collaboration responsibilities to appropriate USIB agency by the geographic committee.
- Editing, coordination and appropriate display of differing views by the committee.
- The infusion of outside expertise drawn from a panel of expert when required by the committee chairman.
- Submission to USIB for approval.

This was written before but would fit well with your concept of the NIO.

12. Our studies of the current NIE/NIAM/NSSM (see attached ICS study) processes suggest that the foregoing is the most straightforward answer to current criticisms of the national product. In addition, it would quite likely solve the persistent problems of competitive estimating within the Community.

13. The IC Staff is at this time preparing a written report and set of recommendations for the consideration of the DCI and USIB. We are not at this time including a proposal to prepare estimates within the structure. However, if you consider this a matter you would care to explore with USIB, we can easily include a description of the option.




Major General, USAF
Deputy to the DCI for the
Intelligence Community

- 2 Attachments
1. Chart
2. NIE/NSSM Study

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*Lets put main stress
on evaluations &
production strategies*



TO:

		ACTION	INFO.			ACTION	INFO.
1	DCI			11	IG		
2	DDCI			12	comp		
3	DDS&T			13	SAVA		
4	DDI			14	ASST/DCI		
5	DDO			15	AO/DCI		
6	DDM&S			16	EX/SEC		
7	D/DCI/IC			17			
8	D/NO			18			
9	GC			19			
10	LC			20			

SUSPENSE

Date

Remarks:

Should we not
raise at USIB
before changing
the Committee?

DCI/DDCI

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